Tweedledum and Tweedledee: Resemblance and Similarity theories and ontological relations.

In the Twentieth century, modernist philosophers like G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle took ordinary things and relations to tackle profound metaphysical problems. Most famously, G.E. Moore in his "Refutation of Idealism" starts with a discussion of properties and moves from the Universe to chairs and tables. It was this example that Virginia Woolf was said to have had in mind in her perambulations in philosophy as found in To the Lighthouse and that delightful character, Mr. Carmichael. I thought of something we are familiar with as a starting point. The cereal bowl. Suppose there are cereal bowls on the table. They are identical to look at. This relation of being exactly the same, is troubling, because one starts to think about it. If the cereal bowl was truly identical to the other. Then the other would not be there! Since to be truly identical it would not only have to have all the same features and qualities that make up its appearance and reality, but it would have to occupy the exact same space. Being identical then is an approximate. Once we step back from this metaphysical quagmire, we see that when we say that the bowl is identical, we mean it is in the sum of elements in its appearance to us at the time of perception. Upon closer inspection we will find differences, because though at one level we enjoy the predictable and similitude, we actually crave for difference and novelty. How do those two bowls differ? Well in the manufacturing process one may have had a marginally different amount of glaze or there might be a slight difference in the patterning. You will be sure to find differences if you look at it with the zeal of tv forensic detective. However, the relationship of being identical is useful in negotiating everyday life. When we buy something, especially a pair, we hope that they are identical. Rather we hope that the degrees of resemblance are such that we and others will take them at first glance as having the same properties – albeit in a pair of socks reversed . Now that is interesting. We can say that the individual socks are identical except for designation, and that pairs of socks resemble each other more than the individuals do. The topic of resemblance has been discussed for many years in philosophy. At what point does one start? Is resemblance arbitrary? Can we predict resemblance? Can we say that given x element that there is a higher probabability that an object will resemble another? Is there a third bowl? An ideal bowl that serves as a template? An approach which I believe is interesting is Tversky's theory of similarity and features. Maybe we can have a theoretical mix of resemblance and similarity theories? Two worlds of similitude? Consider events in the market. We could in portfolio theory analyse performance in terms of resemblance, then seek another more qualitative take using similarity theory. It is like behaviours in an ecosystem. An archer fish in the river will perform and view events differently than its prey a spider on the branch. The life on land and in the river is affected differently. Yet the result of the fish capturing the spider, is an event that occurs in both "worlds". When we look at relations in the world, we should remember that these occur as events in different worlds, though have a metaphysical consequence in the relation of relations.